The Economic Role of Traditional Savings and Credit Institutions in Ethiopia by Begashaw, Girma
c 
Studies in 
Rural Finance 
Economics and Sociology 
Occasional Paper No. 456 
The Economic Role of Traditional Savings 
and Credit Institutions in Ethiopia 
By 
Girma Begashaw 
Agricultural Economist 
February 1, 1978 
Agricultural Finance Center 
IBpartrrent of Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology 
The Ohio State University 
2120 Fyffe Road 
Columbus, Ohio 43210 
The Economic Role of Traditional Savings 
and Credit Institutions in Ethiopia 
By 
Girma Begashaw 
Introduction 
Policy makers in many low income countries (LIC's) have placed a great 
deal of emphasis on expanding formal financial services in rural areas. 
Relatively little attention, however, has been given to the various traditional 
mutual aid associations including the rotating saving and credit associations 
(ROSCA). In some cases, such traditional associations, despite their impor-
tant role in social and economic life of the rural people, are considered to 
be obstacles to development. Ke societies in South Korea, for example, have 
been called obstacles to modernization of agriculture, despite their popular-
ity among peasants [10, 147-158].* 
Even though specific data are required to examine the contribution of 
traditional mutual aid associations including ROSCA's to the savings and 
investment process, I will argue that in the following discussion that 
these traditional associations have the capacity to mobilize a substantial 
amount of resources and can play a positive developmental role. Some stud-
ies have shown that the amounts of savings mobilized and credit granted 
through these associations is substantial. One study done in the Indian 
states of Tamil Nadu and Kerala showed that the deposits made through ROSCA 
were equal to about 20 percent of the total co!111Ercial bank deposits [ 6, 14]. 
In Ethiopia, the 1968-1973 Development Plan estimated the annual savings 
* The first number in the bracket refers to the number of the source in the 
bibliogr-aphy, and the second number( s) refers to the page. 
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volurre through ROSCA's to be 8 to 10 percent of GDP [6, 13]. These savings, 
if productively used, can increase agricultural output and rural incozre. 
The potential usefulness of indigenous saving and credit institutions is 
hardly ever considered by government policy makers. Referril1g to East 
Africa, Jellicoe [5, 2] noted a widespread lack of knowledge at the higner 
levels of govemrrents about these indigenous saving and credit institutions. 
The overall objective of this paper is to describe the various mutual 
aid associations including ROSCA's in Ethiopia. ~hasis will be placed 
on Jkub, a coilllTDn form of ROSCA's in Ethiopia. A detailed description of 
the economic and social f\m.ctions of Jkub, its contribution to mobilization 
of saving and provision of credit, and some of its attributes which contri-
bute to its popularity will be presented. 
In general, there are two major reasons for studying these indigenous 
institutions. The first is that the IIIlltual aid societies and ROSCA' s have 
been in existence for many years and are still widespread, not only in 
Ethiopia, but also in other parts of Africa and Asia, despite the growth of, 
and competition from, form3.l financial institutions in these countries [7, 242]. 
Second, success stories of savings mobilization by forrral financial institu-
tions in LIC's are limited [5, l]. By studying the various forms of the tra-
ditional saving and credit associations, we may be able to learn lessons that 
would enable us to answer why the rural poor do not save and borrow througn 
fonna.l institutions. It may even be possible to identify policies which 
will introduce sone of the positive features of these traditional associa-
tions into the forrTE.l credit institutions, or exploit such traditional in-
stitutions to provide credit and to generate :rrore savings in rural areas. 
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Mutual Aid Associations 
In Ethiopia, there are at least 5 different types of infomal associa-
tions which represent traditional cooperatives, savings and credit, and 
insurance institutions [14]. The ITB.jor ones are described below. 
A. Corrmunity Idir: The purposes of Idir are to provide rrembers with 
assistance during illness or unemployment and for weddings, funerals, etc. 
The organization of Idir is initiated by traditional elders of a community, 
and rrernbership is open to everyone in the villa,Q;e. Idir is run by elected 
officers who include at least a chairITB.n, secretary and a treasurer. Meet-
ings are held monthly or bi-weekly and all members are supposed to attend. 
Non-attenders are fined if the absence is not for emergency reasons. Each 
ID2rnber pays a fixed amount of entrance fee which varies from one Idir to 
another. This fee is distributed to three different accounts: capital 
forITB.tion account, benevolent fund account, and current expense or operat-
ing expense account. For example, in an Idir studied in 1968, out of the 
entrance fee of Eth. $6.25, Eth. $4.00 went to capital forITB.tion, Eth. $2.00 
to benevolent fund and Eth. $0.25 to expense account [14, 12]. A~er join-
ing the Idir, each member contributes a certain fixed amount every month to 
the cormnon fund. 
The Community Idir is the most cormnon form of mutual aid association 
in Ethiopia. It can be found in most villages, towns and cities since 1960. 
The urban Community Idirs are usually inclusive in that everybody living in 
a particular part of the city must join. This is because certain services 
provided by the Idir are not available in the market. 
funeral service and provision of graveyards. 
A typical example is 
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In general the main function of a Corrmunity Idir is to provide assist-
ance for funeral costs and financial assistance to the family of the deceased. 
The financial assistance paid to the family depends on whether the deceased 
is the head of the household (which is usually the husband) or the wife, or 
one of the children. If t:1e existing fund is not sufficient, an additional 
levy is made. The Idir is rrore or less an insurance program run by a com-
mlll1ity to meet emergency conditions. In addition to provision of these so-
cial services, Idirs have implications for rrobilization of saving. It brings 
together small sums of money from the people in a corrmlll1ity that might not 
be saved. The funds not irnrrediately needed are generally deposited in a 
bank (which is the case for most urban Idirs). It is likely that the arrolll1t 
of savings generated througti Idirs, especially urban Idirs, are substantial 
~ since such Idirs include every householder, rich or poor, living in a parti-
cular area. 
' 
B. Regional Associations: Such associations first appeared in Ethiopia 
in the 1950' s. The local name for these associations is Mahaber, a narre bor-
rowed from traditional church associations. In contrast to the church asso-
ciations, membership is open to anybody regardless of religion or sex, as 
long as one comes from the region which bears the name of the association. 
For exarrple, any person who claims to have come from the Gurage Region can 
join the Gurage Mahaber. Such associations are organized in cities and towns, 
particularly the city of Addis Abeba. The purposes of the regional associa-
tions are to help members keep in touch with what happens in the home districts, 
and to raise funds for the construction of roads, schools, and other irnprove-
rrents in the horre districts. This idea was originated by the Gurage :people 
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who still have the largest and wealthiest associations.l The best known 
association of this kind was the one organized to build a road from Alem 
Gena to Wollamo Sodo (about 256 kilometers). By 1965 this organization 
had collected over one million Ethiopian dollars. 2 
There are a number of such self-help organizations, and the amount 
of resources that can be mobilized in this way should not be understated. 
Many rural feeder roads have been constructed. Even though it is diffi-
cult to put a numerical value on the benefits of such roads, the contri-
bution of the improverrents in the infrastructure is, beyond doubt, a pos-
iti ve one. Quantification of the amount of funds and other resources mo-
bilized througti regional associations and the impact on capital formation 
is a legitimate topic for research. 
C. Church Associations (Mahaber) : These are associations connected 
with the Orthodox Church in Ethiopia. Membership is open only to Orthodox 
(Coptic) Christians. The purpose is to collect money for charitable or 
mutual aid purposes. There are different kinds of church associations. 
The best known is the Mahaber forrred by people who feel a spiritual kinship 
to each other because they have a co:rnrrDn favorite saint. Members meet on 
the saint's day, which is every 30 days, in the house of each member in turn. 
The host member provides a meal. The organization provides mediation and 
all members must help each other in any hardship, such as assisting to re-
build a house destroyed by fire, assist a widow, etc. Another similar church 
1 The Gurage are the people who live in the southern part of Shoa Adminis-
trative region in Ethiopia. 
2 Approximately equal to $400,000 U.S. dollars (in 1975). 
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organization is called Serrbete. This is an association whose merrbers take 
turns to bring food and drinks every Sunday to church. After a church 
cererroney the ITEmbers gather for a feast. A Sembete is corrposed of both 
sexes, and merrbers also help each other in case of need. In general, a 
Sembete also provides a forum for exchange of ideas, problems and other 
mutual interests. 
Generally speaking, the church associations are not savings organiza-
tions in the strict sense of the word, as money is not put aside for future 
use. Rather, it is the relationships which are cultivated in the Sembete 
and Mahaber that provides for the smoother functioning of saving and credit 
institutions such as ROSCA's. 
D. other Indigenous Mutual Aid Associations: The Gossa is another im-
portant mutual aid association found among the Oromos in the administrative 
regions of Harar, Welega, Illubabor and Kaffa. 1 Membership is voluntary and 
open to everyone. Three officials are selected in the Gossa, a secretary, 
a treasurer and a head called Gerada. The Gossa provides resources when a 
ITEmber is in financial difficulty. When this happens, members may contribute 
rroney or livestock to the distressed member and the a.rrount is not fixed but 
usually the wealthy give more than the poor. The member who becomes desti-
tute may be given oxen, sheep, cows, goats, and a farm may be rented for him 
for several years. If necessary, he also gets help with the cultivation of 
crops or herding cattle. The Gossa in Harar provides additional services to 
ITEmbers and it is considered to be an irrportant institution. In this region, 
1 Ororros are the people in the western, southern and central parts of Ethiopia. 
Kaffa, Harar, Welega and the Illubabor are the administrative regions 
(formerly provinces) mainly occupied by Oromos. 
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a "brideprice" is essential and poorer men .frequently cannot afford the costs 
involved. In these cases, the Gossa provides for the "brideprice." The 
Gossa also provides for flmerals in much the srure way as the Idir. 
E. The Ikub: A Rotating Savings and Credit Association in Ethiopia: A 
rotating savings and credit association (ROSCA) is defined as "an association 
forrIEd by a group of individuals who agree to make regular contributions to 
a fund which is given, in whole or in pa.rt, to each contributor in rotation" 
[19, 201]. Ikub fits into the above definition as will be explained below. 
The basic principle upon which Ikub is organized is that a fixed amount of 
rroney is collected from each participant, and this fund is given to one of 
the participants in turn. In its simplest form, Ikub consists of a certain 
number of individuals (shares) usually 12, 26, or 52, depending on whether 
the contribution is made monthly, bi-weekly, or weekly. These numbers rep-
resent "effective shares" in the sense that if two people want to participate 
in Ikub but cannot individually afford to contribute a full share, each con-
tributes a certain fraction of the share. For example, one could contribute 
1/3 of a share while the other contributes 2/3, or any other combination. 
Also, rrore than two people can make one "effective" share. As a result, the 
actual number of people in an Ikub is not limited to 12 or 26 or 52. This 
also allows an Ikub to be made up by people from different income classes. 
Payments of the share in Ikub is made to the elected chairperson, usually 
referred to as Dagna (meaning the judge). The Dagna is usually the most re-
spected individual in the neighborhood, often an elderly person with a high 
social and economic status. The duty of the Dagna is to chair the meeting, 
collect the contributions on the spot, and pass the fund to the entitled 
~· 
rrent>er by securing his/her signature. At every rreeting a different participant ~ 
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receives the fund. 'Ihe Digna and his secretary, who is also elected, keep 
track of which participant received the fund each period until all the ef-
fective participants have had their turn. When all the participants have 
received a fund, the Ikub no long;er exists, mless the group agrees to con-
tinue. 'Ihe essential principle involved here is rotating access to a con-
tinually reconstituted fmd. 'Ihe person who receives the fund first becorres 
a debtor to all members, while the person who receives it last is a creditor 
to the rest mtil the last contribution is made. 
'Ihe person who receives the fund at a particular meeting is determined 
by drawing a lot. '.Ihe drawing of the lot , however, may not coincide with 
the credit needs of the rrerrbers. In order to channel the fmds to the per-
son who needs the credit, various alternative approaches may be employed. 
One is that the needy member approaches the group through the Dagna before 
the lot is drawn explaining his/her problems. If the group agrees, this 
person g;ets the fund. 'Ihe second alternative is that the lot is drawn to 
determine the entitled person. If the winner of the fund doesn't have a 
pressing need for the fund, the persons with credit needs approach the 
winner. The winner decides who g;ets the fund depending on the monetary re-
turn offered by the needy member or some other social factors such as per-
sonal relationships. A rronetary reward to the winner is becoming more com-
rron in urban areas and towns, whereas the non-economic criteria are collIIDnly 
used in rural areas. One might expect, that over time, rrore of the Ikubs in 
rural areas would include offers of monetary rewards by needy rrerrbers to 
winners of fmds. Rotating credit associations in other parts of Africa and 
Asia appear to be making this kind of transition. 
In most Ikubs, the person who wins the fund is expected to provide a 
cosigner(s) as collateral for the other participants who have not received 
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any fund distribution. For example, if an Ikub has 12 effective participants, 
the first person receiv:ing the fund will ask either one or more of the re-
m:i.ining 11 participants, depending on the situation, to act as cosigner. 
This is to cover the risks of default. At the next meeting, the second per-
son who is to receive the fund has to provide a cosigner from the remaining 
10, the third from the remaining 9, etc. If, for example, the second receiver 
is a cosigner for the first, the person who is a cosigner for the second is 
ultimately 112sponsible for both the first and second receivers in case both 
default. The participants in Ikub know each other's economic and social 
status because they live in the same community, or work in the same place, 
or are friends or relatives. This provides additional protection against 
default. The fact that the Ikub is very widespread can be taken as an indi-
cation of the low degree of risk of default involved. 
There are many variants of the Ikub in Ethiopia, each with its own rules 
and regulations governing the operation of the association, particularly the 
distribution of the fund. Despite minor diffe112nces am:mg these variants, 
all Ikubs serve the same social and economic purposes in urban as well as 
rural areas. In Addis Abeba, whe112 banking facilities are extensive, Ikub 
rrembership is estimated at 60 percent of total population, while Ikub mem-
bership among craftsrren in Addis, especially weavers, may go as high as 90 
percent [6, 2]. Ethiopia's 1968-1973 Development Plan estimates the annual 
savings volurre in Ikubs as between Eth. $200-250 million (equivalent to 
$120-150 million U.S.). This rep112sents 8 to 10 percent of the GDP. Crafts-
men are said to save more than one-third of their monthly incorre througp 
Ikub, and weavers 40 percent [6, 13]. 
~­,._ 
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Relatively little is known about how funds obtained througtl Ilcub are 
used. A detailed study is necessary to detennine whether these funds are 
used for productive purposes. Sorre insights can be gained into this issue 
by classifying Ikubs by the types of participants. Consider Ikubs organized 
by farmers. If fa.rnErs need credit for productive purposes, most likely it 
is early in the agricultural season for land preparation and planting. As 
explained earlier, generally one participant wins the fund during a rreeting. 
Only one Ikub rrernber, therefore, could get Ikub funds to cover planting 
costs. Most of the others get their funds before or after planting. This 
seasonality in the need for production limits the usefulness of Ikubs for 
this purpose. This irrplies that the fund is most likely used for the pur-
chase of assets such as livestock, education of children or for economically 
C unproductive purposes such as weddings and other social activities. On 
the other hand, funds from Ikub organized by small traders seem to lend 
themselves to more effective (profitable) use than the case discussed above, 
since seasonality has less irrpact on most trading activities. With respect 
to Ikubs organized by gpvernment employees and other urban dwellers, the 
funds are most likely used for the purchase of houses, and other durable as-
sets such as cars. The interesting point here is that most participants in 
these Ikubs have easy access to credit from banks. 
Costs of Borrowing and Returns to Savings in Ikubs 
Rotating credit associations have two general purposes [7]. One is eco-
nomic, a rrediurn of saving and borrowing. It is also one of the institutional 
rrechanisms whose social purpose is the strengthening of conrnunity solidarity, 
' friendship, mutual assistance and mutual social interaction, and the sense of 
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neighborliness. In some cases the social purpose has overwhelming impor-
tance which obscures any economic function. In many cases, however, as the 
cash needs of individuals grow, rotating credit associations become more 
and more irr.portant for the economic functions they perform [7], [16]. The 
social function of ROSCA complicate the calculation of return and cost of 
funds handled by the Ikub. 
To illustrate the costs and return of participating in Ikub, a hypo-
thetical Ikub which consists of 12 participants (shares) is used. Suppose 
the fixed amount of contribution by each merrber per month is $10. The to-
tal fund is then, $120 ($10 x 12). We assume, for simplicity, that all 
the participants have the same intensity of demand for the fund, and thus 
the person who is luckiest gets the first fund and the process of drawing 
lots goes on until the end of the year. Monthly use of the fund is sunrnar- a 
ized in Table 1. 
From the data in the table, the costs and returns for any participant 
can be determined. The participant who wins the first fund receives $120 
including his/her contribution. In effect, he is borrowing $110 from the 
rest of the group at zero nominal interest rate. 1 The first month he receives 
110 dollar-months (row 1 and colurrn 1). 2 Proceeding along the first row, 
during the second month (colurm 2) the first winner contributes $10 to the 
1 If inflation is considered the real interest rate may be negative. 
2 A dollar-m::>nth is the use of one dollar for one month. The figures in 
Table 1 are the net dollar-m::>nths gained. These figures are calculated 
by subtracting the amount of funds that have been contributed (on a 
dollar-month basis) from the amount of funds received (on a dollar-month 
basis). 
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TABLE 1: Net Dollar-Month Use of Funds by Participantsl 
Months 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Total 
1 110 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 660 
2 -10 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 540 
3 -10 -20 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 420 
4 -10 -20 -30 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 300 
5 -10 -20 -30 -40 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 180 
6 -10 -20 -30 -40 -50 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 60 
7 -10 -20 -30 -40 -50 -60 50 40 30 20 10 0 -60 
8 -10 -20 -30 -40 -50 -60 -70 40 30 20 10 0 -180 
9 -10 -20 -30 -40 -50 -60 -70 -80 30 20 10 0 -300 
10 -10 -20 -30 -40 -59 -60 -70 -80 -90 20 10 0 -420 
11 -10 -20 -30 -40 -50 -60 -70 -80 -90 -100 10 0 -540 
12 -10 -20 -30 -40 -50 -60 -70 -80 -90 -100 -110 0 -660 
Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 Adopted from Douglas G. Norvell and Jrures S. Wehrby, "A Rotating Credit Association in the Domin-
ican Republic," Carribean Studies, April 1969. 
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next fund, and is left with 100 dollar-rronths for that period. The third 
rronth the first winner will have a 90 dollar-rronth (column 3), after con-
tributing $10 to the third fund. The first winner's net fund use becorres 
zero only during the 12th month. Row 2 shows the net fund use of the sec-
ond winner during each of the twelve months. The first rronth the fund use 
of the second winner is -10 whereas in the second month it is 100. This 
is because during the first rronth the second winner contributes $10 whereas 
in the second rronth his total contribution to the fund is $20 and thus sub-
tracting this amount from $120 gives us $100. The third rronth, the net fund 
use of the second winner reduces to 90 since $10 must be contributed to the 
fund of the third winner. Each rronth as the second winner contributes $10 
to the funds to be given to subsequent winners, his net fund use reduces 
and it becorres zero during the twelfth month. The rows 3-12 show the net 
fund-use by the third to twelfth winners dlli""."'ing the twelve rronths. Each of 
the twelve colurms shows the dollar-rronth gains and losses during each rronth 
of the Ikub. For exarr:ple, column 1 shows that 100 dollar-rronths are gained 
by the first winner and 10 dollar-rronths are lost by the rest of the parti-
cipants during the first rronth. Column 2 shows a gain of 100 dollar-rronths 
by the first and second winners and a loss of 20 by the rest of the partici-
pants during the second rronth. Since what one loses the other gains, the 
sums of all the columns is zero. Examination of the thirteenth column label-
led "total" shows that overall those participants winning in drawings 1 to 6 
gain sorre use of funds during the 11 rronths of the Ikub. Those who get the 
funds in drawings 7 to 12 sacrifice the use of funds over the 11 rronths. 
Overall, the use of funds sacrificed by the latter is gained by the fo:rrrEr. 
In this particular hypothetical case, those who win in drawings 1 to 6 are ~ 
·~ 
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not paying any price for the use of the fund, and are in fact paying a neg-
ative cost of capital, if we assurrE a tirre value of money. If inflation is 
significant, early winners gain even further. Those whose total net dollar-
rronths are negative are paid a negative interest rate on their sav:ings (lend-
ing). This phenorrena, negative cost of capital to borrowers and negative 
interest rate to savers, result in a redistribution of resources from one 
group to another. 
The above staterrents with respect to the costs of funds and return on 
sav:ings through Ikub are entirely dependent on the assumptions made about 
the operation of hypothetical Ikub. These are the assumptions that drawing 
lots is the process of determining who gets the fund during each month, and 
the assumption that all participants have the sa.IIE intensity of demand and 
thus the funds are not subject to auction. Suppose we relax the latter as-
sumption, that is, the participants have different intensities of demand. 
This !!Eans then there is a possibility for a person with the lowest inten-
sity of demand to win the first drawing, while the person with the extreIJE 
credit need to win last. To accorrodate this imbalance we assume that the 
winner of the fund at each drawing can sell the fund to another participant 
with a more intense credit need at a bargained price. Let us assurrE that 
the first winner of the fund ($120 including the contribution of the winner) 
auctions it and the needy person pays $10 and ta.lees the fund. Under this 
sale, the first winner (seller) is repaid $120 when the buyer's name appears 
in the future drawings. There is an eleIJEnt of speculation here since the 
seller is not sure of when the actual payIJEnt will be made. If the buyer's 
na.nE appears in the second drawings, which has a probability of 1/11, the re-
(; payIJEnt is made during the second month. This means that the $10 paid as a 
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price of the fund by the buyer is the interest paid for $110 for one nx:mth. 1 
However, if the buyer's narre appears in the third drawing, with the prob-
ability of 1/10, the $10 is the interest for $110 for two months. If the 
repayment is made in the last drawing, that is, if the buyer's name appears 
in the last drawing, the $10 is cost of the fund for 11 rronths. The above 
discussion implies that the cost of the fund varies depending on when the 
repayment is rrade (or when the buyer' s narre appears in future drawings) . 
These different costs are shown in Table 2. 
Suppose a loan is paid on the second rronth. The rate of return earned 
by the seller is 109 .1 percent on annual basis. The rate declines as the 
payment period changes. If paid during the third month the rate of return 
becoITEs 54.5 percent. If paid at the end, the rate of return is 9.9 percent. 
With respect to return on saving, the operation of our hypothetical 
Th:ub does not allow for it. Savers do not earn any return from saving, but 
soITE participants can make a windfall gain if they are early winners of the 
fund. For example, suppose the first winner of the fund lends the $110 dol-
lar for $10 as explained above. AssUIJE he is paid during the second month. 
Again, he can lend this money to another participant, say, for a price of 
$8. 00. I:epending on when he is paid he can continue the process of lending 
and, in the ITEantiITE, earning from this process. 
1 Since the $10 price of the fund is paid at the beg:l.nning, the borrower 
(buyer) makes use of $110 dollars instead of $120. 
c 
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TABLE 2: Annualized Cost of Fund by Repayrrent Period 
Repayment Month Cost of Fund1 
Second 109.1% 
Third 54.5% 
Fourth 36.4% 
Fifth 27.3% 
Sixth 21.8% 
Seventh 18.2% 
Eighth 15.3% 
Ninth 13.6% 
Tenth 12.1% 
Eleventh 10.9% 
Twelfth 9.9% 
1 Cost of f'und = $10 x conversion factor to annual basis. 
110 
Probability2 
0.09 
0.10 
0.11 
0.125 
0.143 
0.167 
0.20 
0.25 
0.33 
0.50 
1.00 
2 These probabilities are not mutually exclusive. The probability of 
.5 in the 11th month rreans that if the loan is not paid during the 
preceding months, its probability of repayrrent during the 11th JIDnth 
is . 5. 
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Sumnary and Conclusion 
The role of traditional rrutual aid associations including Ikub (ROSCA) 
in rrobilization of savings and provision of credit is significant in Ethiopia. 
These indigenous associations are popular among men, warren and sorretimes even 
children; in rural areas as well as urban; among the rich and poor; white 
and blue collar workers; and among different social and occupational groups, 
even in places where rrodem banking and saving facilities exist. One rnigtlt 
ask why these traditional institutions are so popular? 'What are sorre of 
their attributes which contribute to this success? 'Why do formal financial 
institutions lack these attributes? Are there lessons to be learned which 
may be helpful in forming forrral saving and credit policies? 
In Ethiopia, ROSCA appear to have the following favorable attributes: 
accessibility, simple procedures, flexibility, adaptability, and they pro-
vide multiple ftmctions. In contrast to formal financial institutions, Ikub 
brings savings and credit facilities down to the most basic level, that is, 
to every village or farm family, even to the poorest segrrent of the popula-
tion. They are very accessible. In addition, the procedures of Ikub are 
sirrple, inforrral and flexible. They are geared to the needs of local condi-
tions. Furtherrrore, effective mechanisms exist to regulate membership eli-
gibility, access, credit ratings and assure repayment. Also, variable con-
tribution allows one to participate according to one's financial ability. 
Flexibility is another attractive feature of Ikubs. The nurrber of par-
ticipants varies. A participant may have more than one share in an Ikub, 
while several people may agree to split one share. One also can join as 
many Ikubs as one desires. The order of rotation of the ftmd may be decided 
I 
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by lot, consensus, seniority, auction, negotiation, etc. Contribution rray 
be daily as with shoeshine boys in Addis Abeba, weekly, or ITDnthly. 
Adaptability is also a reason for the success of the Th::ubs. The sys-
tem of corrpetitive bidding for the fund is an adaptation to accoITDdate dif-
ferences aITDng credit derrands. This adaptation is in line with the evolu-
tion of Ikub from a traditional institution with social and economic pur-
poses towards an institution which places ITDre weight on economic goals. 
The rnulti-d.inEnsional features of Th::ub include financial, social and 
economic. Th::ubs provide savings and credit services to all income groups. 
Periodic contribution permits srrall-scale capital form:l.tion and also gives 
borrowers an opportunity to repay debts in srrall installrrents. Th::ubs also 
foster comrmmity solidarity and group interaction. They preserve tradition 
~ and yet accoITDdate the necessity of change. In rrany instances, these tra-
ditional institutions have been instrurrental in linking urban and rural 
economies. Through these associations capital is transferred from cities 
to villages. Experience from Nigeria, Benin, Ca.nEroon, Surinam and Nepal 
reveal that ROSCA's have played a major role in the transition from rrainly 
subsistence to a predominantly trading economy [5, 11]. 
It is not yet clear if attractive features of ROSCA like the Ikub can 
be adopted by a ITDdem banking system. However, in light of the failure of 
forrral financial institutions in ITDbilization of savings and provision of 
credit to rural poor, it rray be tirre to consider the positive roles ROSCA's 
play in the course of economic developrrent. Two policy irrplications can be 
drawn from the positive features of ROSCA' s and the failure of forrral finan-
cial institutions. The first is that of building financial institutions upon 
traditional saving and credit associations. This is because the ITDdem banking 
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system has its roots in the social and economic environrrent of industrialized 
countries. Transplanting the mdem banking system as it is into a different 
socio-economic environrrent with its own peculiar features may be self-defeat-
ing. As Daniel Levin has noted: 
"It will do no good to transplant a central bank with 
functions of a Bank of England or any other banks 
which have developed their techniques and orientations 
in highly industrialized societies. An economic theory 
[on which the operations of these banks are based] can 
be useful as a guide to policy only if it is relevant 
to a particular society. And for it to be relevant 
it ITillst take into account the structure of the institu-
tions in force. To this end it is worth the tirrE and 
energy required to gain detailed informa.tion concern-
ing local conditions, especially the informal economic 
conditions. • . The cost of not adopting this approach 
is often a virtual failure of govemrent programs to 
penetrate the countryside in any significant manner" 
[11, 99-100]. 
The second policy i~lication is that of integrating the traditional and 
the modem financial institutions. The integration might involve the favor-
able features of ROSCA's such as flexibility, simple procedures, accessi-
bility and adaptability, etc., and the economic function of the modem finan-
cial institution such as paying the savers and charging the borrowers expli-
cit interest rates. 
From a developrrent viewpoint, these approaches are desirable because 
the social rrechanism of ROSCA's can be used to mobilize resources, while re-
warding savers and providing borrowers with credit. Such an integration will 
likely strengthen the formal financial system while enhancing capital formation. 
~ 
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